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LAYING LOW THE SHIBBOLETH OF A FREE PRESS  
Regulatory threats against the American newspaper industry, 1938-1947  
Victor Pickard  
 
As American newspapers came under various forms of financial strain in the 1940s, 
arguably the most significant threat facing the industry during this period was an 
onslaught of media criticism in conjunction with a series of attempted state interventions. 
This paper fleshes out recurring themes of 1940s media criticism and shows how they 
coincided with moves toward regulating the press, which had begun in the late 1930s. 
Using historical methods, including close readings of newspaper, trade press, and activist 
literature and other materials that shed light on debates around press reform, this critical 
revisionist history brings into focus a formative period in the American press system’s 
development. The history that emerges from this archival evidence does not simply bring 
previously under-researched areas into focus; it also questions the presumed natural 
laissez-faire arrangement between the American government and the press ̶ ̶an 
assumption that largely remains intact to this day. 
 
KEYWORDS American journalism; journalism history; media policy; media reform; 
newspaper industry; political economy  
 
Introduction 
  The American Society of Newspaper Editors’ (ASNE) annual conventions were typically 
grand affairs. Political elites made dramatic appearances and gave what were later hailed as 
significant speeches. In attendance were editors from top newspapers, as well as prominent 
commentators and reporters. At the opening of the 1947 ASNE meeting, however, all did not 
seem well with American newspapers. In his farewell speech, outgoing ASNE president and New 
York Herald Tribune editor Wilbur Forrest warned the incoming ASNE administration and general 
membership of a pair of looming threats. Forrest identified the first threat as ‘‘the control over 
the publication of news now exercised by labor union chieftains’’ whose ‘‘manipulation of 
newsprint supplies and costs’’ amounted to ‘‘a violation of press freedom.’’ These ‘‘little 
dictators’’ hold ‘‘power unprecedented in our history,’’ he warned. Labor unions ‘‘may shut down 
one or all of the newspapers in any given community literally overnight ... Vigilance must be 
constant’’ (ASNE 1947, 18).  
Forrest identified the second threat as government regulation. He decried a ‘‘government 
commission’’ that questioned ‘‘the advisability of granting a radio license to a newspaper because 
of its alleged opinions on race and religion.’’ Warning of ‘‘government censorship,’’ Forrest 
informed the audience that, ‘‘[w]e have knowledge that there is a campaign on foot to tear down 
the prestige of the American press as an institution in order to obtain government regulation of 
the press. Is not regulation a step in the direction of control?’’ (ASNE 1947, 1819). Recommending 
that ASNE become more aggressive in defending its understanding of freedom of the press, 
Forrest reminded the audience, ‘‘We are ... in an era in which the American press is and will be 
under attack by those who constantly seek some measure of regulation’’ (1819). Forrest called 
for the creation of a ‘‘small but active committee to pass on the meaning of the term ‘freedom 
of the press’’’ to combat a ‘‘decided misconception as to the meaning of that term’’ (18). He 
worried that invocation of ‘‘freedom of the press’’ might give ‘‘some commissar a round-about 
hand on deciding what is proper or improper,’’ thereby justifying a ‘‘legislative step’’ toward 
regulating ‘‘the news columns’’ (1819). He noted that the ‘‘twenty-five or thirty authors who have 
elected in recent years to needle the press’’ ignore how the reader is the final judge of press 
performance. If enough readers ‘‘write in and say they are in complete disagreement with the 
paper,’’ Forrest argued, it ‘‘can give a publisher or an editor the jitters.’’ Citing record-breaking 
newspaper sales as evidence that criticism was unfounded, Forrest insisted that the charge that 
advertisers or any party other than ‘‘the daily reader’’ controls newspaper policy ‘‘is just so much 
outmoded claptrap’’ (18-19).  
A primary cause for Forrest’s fear soon became clear. A shadowy, illegitimate group 
dismissed by Forrest as ‘‘eleven-thirteenths percent pedagogic personnel’’ and mischaracterized 
as a ‘‘government commission’’ was seen as an entering wedge for the government’s regulatory 
agenda against the newspaper industry. The ‘‘Commission on Freedom of the Press,’’ popularly 
known as the ‘‘Hutchins Commission,’’ was a group of high-profile intellectuals appointed to 
investigate freedom and responsibility of the press. Based on the trade organization’s reaction, 
the Commission was seen as a significant threat. Several pages of ASNE’s published proceedings 
are devoted to Forrest’s lengthy rebuttal of the commission’s press critique, particularly as it 
related to ASNE’s ethical code. Forrest issued a call to arms for the industry to unite against these 
outside threats. 
 
Previous Scholarship and Research Questions  
Even if he mistook the messenger for the problem, Forrest had legitimate cause for 
concern. On the surface, indicators suggested a postwar newspaper boom: circulation, 
advertising revenue, and employment numbers were all increasing dramatically. Yet Davies 
(2006) demonstrates convincingly that, despite a brief boom, 1945 marked the beginning of a 
slow downward spiral— what he calls the ‘‘Postwar Decline of Newspapers.’’ Although he does 
not see the industry in crisis, Baughman (2009) similarly pegs 1945 as the beginning of the 
‘‘orderly retreat of the newspaper’’ that was ‘‘wounded but not slain’’ ̶̶a pattern extending to the 
present. Indeed, 1940s newspapers, not unlike those today, faced a sudden rise in local 
monopolies, spiraling production costs, labor disputes, and public distrust (Davies 2006; Baker 
2007).  
Analyses of the industry’s postwar woes notwithstanding, little research has examined 
1930s and 1940s media criticism and state interventions against the newspaper industry, the 
extent to which publishers feared regulation, and its implications for restructuring the press. 
Furthermore, while contemporaneous events like the Hutchins Commission have been the 
subject of much analysis, little work has focused on the broader historical context, particularly 
the 1940s newspaper crisis (with important precursors in the late 1930s), and a sudden spike in 
press criticism. While two press histories have focused on postwar media reform and criticism 
(Blanchard 1977; Marzolf 1991), a closer analysis of recurring themes, tensions, and, specifically, 
how this criticism coincided with a move toward regulating the press is missing from the 
literature. 
 Using historical methods, this study locates and interrogates the historical antecedents 
that led to a lightly regulated press in the United States. Through close readings of newspaper, 
trade press, and activist literature, the paper focuses on the anatomy of 1940s press criticism and 
contemporaneous attempts to regulate newspapers. These texts provide a narrative backdrop 
for the newspaper crisis, while analyses of archival materials shed light on governmental efforts 
to regulate the press. The critical revisionist history of a formative period in the American press’s 
development that emerges from these materials does not simply bring previously under-
researched areas into focus—it also questions the presumed natural laissez-faire arrangement 
between government and the press. Such a history holds significant implications for our 
contemporary journalism crisis. Although the precise nature of these crises differs, questions 
about state interventions against the press have once again come to the fore (Pickard 2011a). 
 
The 1940s Newspaper Crisis and Press Criticism 
 The mid-1940s saw multifaceted challenges for newspapers. ‘‘It is a fact,’’ stated an 
editorial in Editor & Publisher in 1946, that ‘‘newspapers in general have become the national 
whipping boy’’ (Editor & Publisher 1946b). Looking back at 1947, the trade magazine described 
how that year had subjected newspapers ‘‘to the most searching analysis and criticism in all their 
history’’ (Editor & Publisher 1948, 17). Similar sentiments were shared across a wide range of 
other media, trade journals, and journalists’ own accounts. That the press was in crisis had 
become almost a mainstream notion in the broader public. As 1940s press institutions fought for 
their very legitimacy, criticisms that previously were associated with radical politics were 
increasingly embraced as commonsensical (Blanchard 1978). Calls for government intervention 
were on the rise, prompting warnings from all sides that the press must shape up before it was 
too late. Reformist innovations proposed by the industry, like citizen councils designed to 
confront the ‘‘rising tide of dissatisfaction,’’ were gaining traction, if only to prevent further 
public criticism and possible government intervention (Editor & Publisher 1946b). 
 In fact, the newspaper industry faced opposition from all three branches of government. 
President Roosevelt encouraged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to scrutinize 
newspaper chains (which were primarily pro-Republican and pro-business) and prevent them 
from acquiring radio stations; the Supreme Court upheld an important antitrust measure against 
the Associated Press (AP); and Congress was preparing investigations on the disappearance of 
small newspapers (U.S. Congress 1947). A severe newsprint shortage, combined with a strike 
wave by printers unions, served to negate some of commercial newspapers’ other gains. One 
historian notes: 
 Concentration of ownership had cut in half newspaper competition in ninety-two cities 
with 100,000 or more population, and one quarter of those were chain newspapers. The 
nation had fewer total newspapers, more chain ownerships, fewer local features and 
columnists, and more syndicated columns. A few voices reached millions, limiting the 
number of ideas circulating and giving undue prominence to those that were amplified. 
(Marzolf 1991, 153) 
That press freedoms were reserved for only those wealthy enough to own a newspaper 
was just one of the industry’s legitimacy problems. While economic and labor problems plagued 
newspapers’ production, criticism regarding newspapers’ content drew government regulators’ 
attention. Criticism of press coverage was symptomatic of deeper structural problems tracing 
back to the ‘‘first great newspaper crisis’’ of the Progressive Era, when the modern commercial 
press, ensuing contradictions between public service and private profits, and the 
professionalization of journalism all arose simultaneously (McChesney and Scott 2004; Pickard 
2008, 309-321). Placing the 1940s press crisis in this historical trajectory throws into sharp relief 
its structural origins, suggesting that crisis is coded into the commercial press system’s DNA. 
 Writing in 1949, the newspaper historian Edwin Emery (1950) observed that postwar 
criticism was ‘‘the biggest problem which confronted the daily newspapers of America’’ (244). 
The Progressive Era’s radical media criticism had expanded beyond dissident elites and socialists 
like Upton Sinclair to include academics, political dissidents, former journalists, and New Dealers. 
Activist groups produced their own papers while experiments like the ad-less newspaper, PM, 
were beginning to emerge (Milkman 1997). Commercial newspapers suffered a crisis of 
confidence amid growing public distrust (Davies 2006, 15-29; Marzolf 1991). Echoing Progressive 
and New Deal era discourse as well as 1940s radio critiques (Pickard 2011b), press criticism from 
this era fell into four broad types: structural (issues related to the ownership and control of 
newspapers), informational (the informational deficits in newspaper content arising from these 
structural factors), racial (misrepresentations of marginalized groups in newspaper content), and 
commercial (the effects of advertising and other commercial values on news selection, omissions, 
and emphases). This social and intellectual milieu of vibrant press criticism contextualizes the 
reformist push toward regulating the press, newspapers’ reaction to these challenges, and the 
subsequent resolution negotiated in the mid-to-late 1940s in fora like the Hutchins Commission. 
 
Structural Critique 
 The 1940s structural critique of newspapers is best exemplified by the work of Morris 
Ernst, who saw a pronounced need for government intervention to remedy structural flaws in 
the American press system. Ernst’s book First Freedom — a kind of bible for the growing 1940s 
media reform movement — took on, in equal parts, radio, film, and newspapers. Ernst described 
the problem with newspapers in structural terms: 
 
 Ten states have not a single city with competing daily papers. Twenty-two states are 
without Sunday newspaper competition. Fourteen companies owning eighteen papers 
control about one quarter of our total daily circulation. Three hundred and seventy-chain 
newspapers own about one fifth of all our circulation. More than a quarter of our daily 
circulation is absentee-owned. We have a thousand less owners than a few decades ago. 
Thirty-two hundred weeklies— the backbone of local democracy — have disappeared. 
One company dominates more than 3000 weeklies. There are only 117 cities left, in our 
entire nation, where competing dailies still exist. (1946, xii) 
 
To counteract these trends, reformers like Ernst stressed the need for laws preventing joint 
ownership of media outlets and interlocking directorates, as well as a tax levied against chain 
newspapers. Ernst recommended a joint Senate-House inquiry aimed at protecting diversity of 
opinions in the news by maintaining diversity of news organizations, especially among small 
dailies, weeklies, and magazines. He also proposed structural interventions like tax breaks for 
small newspapers and forbidding media corporations’ vertical integration so that publishers 
divested their ownership of wood pulp, paper, and forests (Ernst 1946, 249-260). 
 Much of this structural criticism focused on media monopolies. For example, Villard’s 
(1944) The Disappearing Daily came to the conclusion, after 20-plus years of observing 
newspaper monopolies, that commercial pressures encouraged propagandistic news, poor 
quality in reporting, and pro-war inclinations. The book attributed the sudden rise of one-
newspaper towns to chain newspapers that acquired or drove out smaller papers from the 
market. The rise of media monopolies alarmed both radical and liberal pamphleteers. George 
Marion, a Newspaper Guild member, penned a radical exemplar, The ‘‘Free Press’’: Portrait of a 
Monopoly. Marion argued that press freedom was limited to the super-rich who used 
newspapers to maintain power and accumulate more wealth: ‘‘Newspapers being a Big Business, 
the views of newspaper owners are the views of Big Business.’’ Thus, those who parroted rhetoric 
about America’s press freedoms served as stooges for a corporate elite (Marion 1946, 11). That 
newspapers presented themselves as victims, Marion insisted, was an utter fraud given the 
history of government press subsidies like special mailing privileges estimated to cost taxpayers 
between $10 million and $25 million a year, and indirect subsidies including the expanded 
capacity for news transmissions via publicly-financed telecommunications infrastructure. Beyond 
sensationalist news coverage, the worst consequence of the press becoming a ‘‘Big Business’’ 
and ‘‘brutal monopoly,’’ according to Marion, was its utility to the ‘‘fascist fringe’’ like that 
represented by media mogul William Randolph Hearst (20). To contest these trends, Marion 
called for a more prominent labor press that would ‘‘reduce the wavering to which liberal papers 
tend’’ and ‘‘also combat the commodity-news pattern.’’ Such a paper might ‘‘help create an 
audience for balanced, trustworthy information . . . [that tells] the truth about the American press 
— that it is the uncontrolled and unlimited voice of monopoly capital.’’ Marion concluded that 
press reform efforts ‘‘must operate within the framework of a larger political program. Only a 
program that understands the necessity for curbing the huge monopolies — even within the 
limits of the capitalist system — can seriously approach the problem of press freedom’’ (47). This 
task placed ‘‘the heaviest responsibility upon Marxists and class-conscious workers, manual and 
intellectual, newspapermen not least among them’’ (47). 
 While radicals like Marion emphasized the systemic nature of the newspaper crisis and 
pushed for structural reform, many liberals were more concerned about protecting First 
Amendment-guaranteed freedoms. In line with the latter, noted civil libertarian Robert Cushman 
(1946) authored a post-war pamphlet titled Keep Our Press Free. Believing the US press system 
was essentially just and protected under the Constitution, Cushman’s liberal critique saw the 
gravest threat to press freedoms from governmental overreach. 
Cushman nonetheless felt compelled to conclude by criticizing newspapers’ basic 
commercial structure. Recounting the Soviet charge that Americans ‘‘do not have a free press in 
the United States because [their] newspapers are controlled by business interests who dictate 
newspaper policy and determine what the American public shall read,’’ Cushman allowed that 
this critique ‘‘commands serious attention.’’ He wondered: 
 
 Are there also private threats to the independence of the press resulting from the fact 
that the publishing of newspapers and magazines in this country has become a very big 
business? Are we producing newspapers that reflect the political, economic, and social 
views of the owners and advertisers, and from whose pages are kept news stories and 
editorials that might offend the owner or advertiser or injure his business? (Cushman    
1946, 27) 
 
Conceding that ‘‘our newspapers have become . . . giant money-making enterprises,’’ Cushman 
noted that 66% of modern newspapers’ revenue came from advertising, meaning ‘‘that you and 
I pay for our advertisers, not by subscribing to them, but by buying the popular brands of 
cigarettes, toothpaste, or automobiles which advertise in them’’ (Cushman 1946, 27). Seeing 
other threats to a free press, including economic concentration lack of newspaper competition, 
increased standardization, and homogenous opinion, Cushman suggested that collective legal 
measures might be necessary. In the absence of any self-correcting mechanism, publishers and 
press associations ‘‘have resisted with all their strength every effort by the government to subject 
them, as business concerns, to the legal controls which are imposed in other forms of business’’ 
(28). He concluded that ‘‘freedom of the press remains in danger as long as the owners of 
newspapers do not regard their business as ‘affected with a public interest’ whether the law 
imposes that status or not’’ (30). 
Beyond disaffected intellectuals, public disquiet toward newspaper monopolies was also 
common. In November 1946, well over 2000 Akron, Ohio residents packed into an auditorium for 
a panel discussion on the question ‘‘Is the American Press Really Free?’’ Broadcast on the radio 
program America’s Town Meeting of the Air, the panel focused entirely on the issue of newspaper 
monopolies. Panelists included a newspaper editor, the New Republic editor, and Morris Ernst, 
who suggested subsidizing smaller dailies to help reduce media concentration. When the 
audience was asked who among them felt that the American press was truly free, only a 
sprinkling of hands went up (The Guild Reporter 1946c; Davies 2006, 25). At a similar town 
meeting in Cleveland, the reported consensus was that the ‘‘press is not keeping faith with the 
public.’’ A guildsman participating in the discussion claimed, ‘‘Everybody appears concerned 
about the papers except the publishers . . . They alone seem smugly satisfied with the 
performance of the properties they own’’ (The Guild Reporter 1949). The panel reflected public 
cynicism toward the press, but also the resignation of many journalists that the cynicism was 
justified (Davies 2006, 26-27). 
A major component of structural criticism focused on news workers’ labor conditions. 
Although not as militant as it was in the 1930s, the Newspaper Guild’s weekly paper, The Guild 
Reporter, continued to challenge commercial newspapers and regularly published reports on 
strikes during the 1940s. It consistently offered radical structural criticism of the newspaper 
industry, calling out the threat of monopolization and its connections to larger political economic 
shifts while reflecting a class consciousness largely absent elsewhere in the press (The Guild 
Reporter 1946a, 3). Labor relations abruptly worsened with the postwar printers’ strikes led by 
the International Typographical Union (ITU) against the publishers. The years 1945-1948 
witnessed a spate of strikes; the ITU struck against 78 papers between 1945 and 1947, and 50 in 
1948 alone. These strikes were sometimes reinforced by walkouts from other craft unions, which 
landed crippling blows against dozens of papers in the late 1940s (Davies 2006, 8-9). 
Publishers were often ruthless in their retaliation. They developed technological 
workarounds by experimenting with photo engraving, offset printing, and teletype-setting to 
bypass human labor (Time 1947; Davies 2006, 10-11). They also lobbied policymakers for 
advantageous legislation. Tracy (2011) suggests that publishers aggressively advocated for the 
Taft-Hartley Law to use it against the printer unions, which were among the oldest, most 
powerful, and most effective craft unions. Taft-Hartley undercut unions’ organizing efforts by 
outlawing the closed shop, bringing union foremen into management, and transforming the 
National Labor Relations Board into a kind of strike-breaking agency. ‘‘The American Newspaper 
Publishers Association [ANPA] and its affiliates believe the Taft-Hartley Act has provided weapons 
to smash the [ITU],’’ The Guild Reporter (1947c) stated. Tracy notes that the ITU strikes were seen 
as guinea pigs for Taft-Hartley, with Chicago, the site of a massive strike, the definitive 
battleground. Labor conflict underscored a core facet of the structural critique understood by 
both news owners and workers: conflicts over controlling newspapers struck at the nexus of 
political and economic power in US society. 
 
Informational Critique 
 
Many press critics in the 1940s focused on the dearth of quality information provided by 
the mainstream press. No one better exemplifies the informational critique than George Seldes, 
who in 1940 launched the weekly In Fact, a four-page newsletter devoted to press criticism and 
investigative reporting. Subtitled ‘‘An Antidote to Falsehoods in the Daily Press,’’ In Fact’s 
circulation peaked at 176,000 subscribers in 1947, and was read widely by union activists. 
Seldes’s articles typically addressed commercial media omissions and misrepresentations of 
important social issues like labor relations and economic injustices. Despite wide readership, 
Seldes was relentlessly red-baited and was forced to close his paper in 1950 (PublicEye.org, n.d). 
More mainstream postwar press criticism came from the likes of A.J. Liebling and Don 
Hollenbeck. Credited with establishing ‘‘a professional genre of journalism criticism’’ through the 
New Yorker’s ‘‘Wayward Press’’ column and the 15-minute weekly radio program CBS Views the 
Press, these two commentators posed both stylistic and normative questions about press ethics 
and responsibility (Marzolf 1991, 177-183; Davies 2006, 26). Liebling criticized what he saw as 
formulaic news meant to entertain but not inform. He decried the explosion of one-paper towns, 
which he likened to a ‘‘privately owned public utility that is constitutionally exempt from public 
regulation,’’ and a ‘‘violation of freedom of the press’’ (quoted in Marzolf 1991, 179; Liebling 
1947). He felt this gross lack of competition forced the individual journalist to toe the publisher’s 
line, leaving audiences bereft of diverse sources of information. Similarly, Hollenbeck delivered a 
consistent critique of mainstream media by singling out particular social issues it neglected to 
cover, often because a powerful interest was implicated. He sometimes supplied Seldes with 
‘‘information about overlooked news stories, pro-business bias, and other press misdeeds’’ 
(Davies 2006, 26). 
This genre of press criticism was represented by the Nieman Reports, a quarterly journal 
published by Harvard’s Nieman fellows, which announced itself as ‘‘filling a void’’ (1947, 19). The 
1945-1946 class published a noteworthy book of press criticism that portrayed newspapers as 
failing to serve interests beyond those of their profit-seeking owners (Svirsky 1947). Summarizing 
contemporary criticism, the fellows noted that many felt that the press was irresponsible, biased 
in favor of property and privilege, and too narrowly owned and controlled (The Guild Reporter 
1947b, 7). Because Nieman Fellows were experienced working journalists, they were given 
attention not automatically bestowed on other critics. The New Republic heralded Nieman 
Reports as ‘‘a work that deserves to stand with the valuable current investigations of the same 
subject by A.J. Liebling and Don Hollenbeck’’ (New Republic 1947; quoted in Davies 2006, 27). 
Another report by the 1949-1950 fellows criticized the decreasing quality of news writing 
(Nieman Reports 1950). These efforts helped mainstream press criticism; what had been the 
province of the radical left was now embraced across an ever-widening political spectrum 
(Blanchard 1978). 
 
Racial Critique 
 
The racial critique of newspapers focused on both media production and representation. 
While American dailies employed few African American journalists, a vibrant African American 
press arose to challenge misrepresentations in the national media while advocating for civil 
rights. As one eminent historian has observed, the number of African American newspapers 
increased from 150 to 250 in the 1940s. These included the Chicago Defender, the Pittsburgh 
Courier, the Atlanta Daily World, the Los Angeles Sentinel, and the New York Amsterdam News. 
The largest postwar periodicals to emerge were the ‘‘picture magazines’’ Ebony in Chicago and 
Our World in New York. A number of smaller press organizations sprang up in the mid-1940s in 
places like Nashville and Atlanta (Mott 1950, 794-795). 
Despite this vibrant journalistic milieu, few African American journalists worked in the 
mainstream press. As late as 1955, the African American journalist Simeon Booker estimated 
there were approximately two dozen mainstream African American journalists. Baughman notes 
how African Americans’ were either segregated to sections in the back of the newspaper or, 
especially in the South, restricted to a separate ‘‘black star’’ edition distributed only in black 
communities. African Americans’ few mentions in mainstream newsprint were often crime-
related. And even in the most banal stories, blacks most often lacked courtesy titles of ‘‘Mr.’’ and 
‘‘Mrs.’’ afforded to whites (Baughman 2009, 3). 
Although other groups felt maligned and misrepresented in print media, African 
Americans had long sought fairer treatment in the press, pushing to change the practice of 
identifying African Americans by race in news stories (Editor & Publisher 1945). Because many 
felt this was stigmatizing, some newspapers, like the New York Times, changed their policy 
following the war, a move that attracted the attention of other leading media (Time 1946). A New 
York Times (1946) editorial vowed to cease ‘‘extending Jim Crowism to the printed page [so as to 
not help] build up the bad moral climate which does encourage violence among the ignorant, the 
weak and the vicious.’’ Noting that in crime stories, ‘‘Negroes are often identified, whereas 
members of other races are not,’’ the editorial asserted that although ‘‘this may seem a small 
thing’’ African Americans ‘‘do not think so.’’ The editorial ended righteously: ‘‘News that 
encourages racial discrimination may sometimes be of interest, but responsible journalism has a 
higher law than a passing interest.’’ 
Racial issues also impacted on labor organizing--both in African American newspapers, 
whose workers felt particularly vulnerable, and organizers of local industries who depended on 
racial solidarity and fair news treatment (The Guild Reporter 1945a, 1945c). Particularly in the 
South, papers used racism to combat CIO organizing. The Guild Reporter (1946e) singled out one 
paper because it ‘‘engaged in anti-Semitic activities and . . . played on race prejudice’’ to target 
specific plants and undermine organizing work. Demonstrating the ties between media 
structures, content, and political pressure, 1940s criticism also focused on the commercial values 
permeating news production resulting from advertising’s growing influence on news institutions. 
 
Commercialism Critique 
 
Many commentators noted that newspapers’ dependence on advertising helped shape 
the news. One bellwether book decrying dangers of an advertiser-dominated press was Harold 
Ickes’s (1941) edited collection of journalistic essays, which argued that it was every citizen’s duty 
to criticize the press’s shortcomings. One essayist in the book, Ralph Ingersoll, the founder of the 
experimental ad-less paper PM, described how newspapers should be liberated from 
‘‘antagonistic interests’’ like advertising and political pressures. Similarly, the Rutherford Courier 
editor observed that the ‘‘framers of the constitution didn’t foresee advertising’’ as becoming 
what ‘‘newspapers would come to depend for their existence’’ and thus more reliant on 
‘‘commercial interests than upon the people at large.’’ The ad-driven press confirmed the 
framers’ logic that ‘‘newspapers can be expected generally to show an allegiance to that group 
upon which they are most dependent’’ (Lasseter 1947, 2). 
A number of Guild Reporter stories noted advertisers’ increasing power as newspaper ad 
sales grew to new heights. Approving a Supreme Court decision that ruled misleading ads were 
not protected by the Constitution, The Guild Reporter argued that the newspaper advertisers 
implicated in the court’s decision were ‘‘corrupt and cynical hucksters, intent on bamboozling 
the public out of ready money.’’ The article also noted how advertisers ‘‘were paying us [the 
journalists] to do it for them . . . buying columns, and full pages in our papers and magazines.’’ 
While some in the press ‘‘gave the matter little thought’’ and others, ‘‘pleased by the tinkling of 
the cash registers, thought it good,’’ there were a ‘‘few [who] looked ahead and saw that if the 
free market of thought became the free market of phony goods, there soon would be no market 
at all.’’ And if this were to happen, ‘‘the public would get tired’’ and ‘‘crack down on the whole 
mess’’ (Stokes 1948). While this criticism galvanized the public to confront newspapers in their 
local communities, the US federal government challenged the newspaper industry on multiple 
fronts. 
 
Toward Regulating the Press 
 
Much of the 1940s regulatory activism had its roots in the 1930s. While the Newspaper 
Guild challenged newspapers over fundamental questions of ownership and control from below 
(Scott 2009), New Deal liberals hatched plans to rein in the industry at the policy level. In 1938, 
President Roosevelt made the unusual move of issuing a five page letter to the St. Louis Dispatch 
that questioned whether a for-profit press was compatible with freedom of the press (Usher 
2009). That same year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) quietly began amassing information on 
print media concentration. A secret report circulated at the highest reaches of the DOJ reveals 
the Roosevelt administration’s aggressive tactics toward the press (Confidential Memorandum 
to Assistant Attorney General Arnold 1938). The first page of this self-described ‘‘scouting report 
on restraints of trade in the newspaper industry’’ suggested it was ripe for a thorough 
governmental investigation and possible intervention. Given how industries such as ‘‘steel, 
bread, milk and farm machinery’’ had been ‘‘previously investigated,’’ the report suggested that 
a similar investigation of the press, about which ‘‘even the informed public knows nothing,’’ 
would perhaps ‘‘unearth something strikingly new in character.’’ 
The report determined that ‘‘newspapers would be ideal’’ because ‘‘the industry is under 
general suspicion by the public.’’ ‘‘Outside of an inner clique,’’ the report noted, few understood 
the structural makeup of the trade; and ‘‘the majority outside are curious.’’ Moreover, the report 
noted, the industry had thus far escaped close governmental scrutiny, and was therefore 
‘‘notorious’’ because its ‘‘industrial structure was completely overlooked.’’ The DOJ was 
therefore poised to assess the business at a structural level. Cautioning that ‘‘the work has had 
to be done very quietly’’ and be ‘‘limited to government records,’’ the DOJ’s initial findings were 
promising. ‘‘The [monopolistic] restraints that exist are fundamental to the current organization 
of the industry,’’ the report concluded. ‘‘They can easily be dramatized; their mere recitation 
should forever lay low the shibboleth of ‘freedom of the press’.’’ 
This shibboleth came under intense scrutiny as the report cataloged the various 
‘‘restraints’’ through which newspapers suppressed competition: a lack of availability of news 
services, limited to the AP, the Scripps-owned United Press, and the Hearst-owned International 
News Service; price-fixing by news services (through which some papers were given preferential 
treatment); connections of the newspaper industry to outside interests, such as investors, 
leading to the rapid expansion of newspaper chains and vertical consolidation; subsidization by 
advertisers, which not only influenced news content but could be ‘‘gamed’’ by organizations like 
the Association of Advertising Agencies (the report noted: ‘‘this reliance upon advertising has the 
effect of placing control in the hands of outside business men without the necessity of their 
actually making investments in the industry’’); newspaper acquisition of radio stations 
accelerating at an alarming rate, with 
‘‘more than a third of the stations in the country identified with newspapers’ interests’’; and 
collusion on prices, with the result that ‘‘control is considerably concentrated’’ with ‘‘five 
newspaper chains publishing about 50 papers’’ that ‘‘consume about 40 percent of the total 
annual consumption of 4,250,000 tons of newsprint.’’ 
 The report noted concerns about the ‘‘‘big business’ aspect of the newspaper industry,’’ 
given that ‘‘the striking change in the newspaper industry in the last fifty years is the size of the 
individual unit.’’ The report noted that startup costs for a daily paper in a large city were between 
$2 million and $3 million--beyond the means of any but the wealthiest, especially since ‘‘a 
newcomer must expect to lose money for a year or more while he builds up circulation and 
entices advertisers.’’ ‘‘This fact,’’ the report noted, ‘‘has slowly changed the character of the 
personnel in the business,’’ from partisan to profit-driven publishers, thus ‘‘the individual whose 
interest was focused on spreading his particular gospel and only secondarily on the balance sheet 
has faded out.’’ ‘‘The successful publisher today,’’ the report stated, ‘‘is one primarily concerned 
with making money.’’ It continued: 
 
As a businessman, the publisher reflects the prejudices of his kind. 
Anything which increases his costs or curtails his profits--the wages and 
hours bill, the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board], a tightening up of a 
taxation--is anathema. The trend away from the New Deal can partly be 
ascribed to the gradual realization among publishers that they too were to 
help pay the price. While this condition of ‘‘big business’’ exists, the public 
cannot expect to get impartial stories of the news. (Confidential 
Memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Arnold 1938) 
 
Among major papers the report claimed ‘‘a united front is presented . . . on labor policy,’’ ranging 
from supporting each other during labor strikes to sharing information on ‘‘obstreperous’’ 
individuals. ‘‘A man who is fired for his union activities,’’ the report noted, ‘‘is, of course, 
‘blackballed’.’’ 
The report further focused on the AP’s demonstrated or potential abuses. Despite the 
fact that ‘‘the AP describes itself as a cooperative run for and by its members,’’ the report claimed 
the news syndicate was instead wielding ‘‘autocratic control,’’ and should be seen ‘‘more 
accurately [as] a private club controlled by a group of insiders.’’ Referring to its various functions 
as a ‘‘pervasive system of censorship’’ by an outfit that commanded ‘‘possibly a monopoly’’ in its 
control of the newspaper industry, the report sketched some of the government’s subsequent 
antitrust arguments against the AP. It also considered investigating advertising’s influence by 
checking ‘‘large advertising contracts discovered in the investigation of other industries with the 
coincident development of favorable stories and editorials in newspapers.’’ The probable effects 
of advertisers subsidizing newspapers were alarming, but the greatest threat, the report 
suggested, was newspapers’ increasing acquisitions of radio stations. 
Although radio’s arrival as ‘‘an advertising competitor caused consternation in the trade,’’ 
the report noted that newspapers’ worries were ‘‘somewhat lifted by a determined policy of 
acquisition of the new medium.’’ Making matters worse, the FCC had ‘‘taken a stand-off position; 
though recognizing the problem, they say their job is to regulate radio stations and not 
newspapers.’’ The report pinpointed cross-ownership’s dangers: ‘‘the news policies of the radio 
stations are, of course, attuned to those of the publishers and their newspapers.’’ For example, 
‘‘Where newspapers have been closed by strikes, the affiliated radio stations have conveyed the 
publisher’s side of the story; and some libel suits are now pending against newspaper-owned 
stations by the Newspaper Guild.’’ The report concluded that ‘‘unless this trend is stopped by 
action of the government, in the next few years the newspapers will own and control most of the 
radio stations in the country.’’ 
Several years later the DOJ would have its chance to go after newspapers. What began as 
the DOJ’s first serious attempt to bring the Sherman Antitrust Act to bear on the newspaper 
industry resulted in establishing some of the most progressive First Amendment judicial decisions 
in American history. The DOJ sued the AP in 1942 for hindering trade by refusing wire services to 
the liberal Marshall Field-owned Chicago Sun while maintaining an exclusive market contract 
with the right-wing Chicago Tribune, owned by Colonel Robert McCormick. The court case began 
in 1943 and generated fierce debate. Those siding with the newspaper industry stressed 
libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment that, they believed, rendered the industry 
immune to antitrust interventions (Blanchard 1987). Ultimately the case was decided by a three-
judge panel in federal district court: the panel ruled two to one against the AP on a relatively 
novel line of argumentation that was nonetheless supported by important precedents, such as 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s contention that democracy required the maintenance of an open 
marketplace of ideas. According to Judge Learned Hand, this democratic imperative not only 
superseded newspapers’ interests but also fell under the protection of the First Amendment: 
 
Neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of the newspaper 
industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital of all general 
interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as 
many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if 
indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it 
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative process. To many 
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all. (United States 
v. Associated Press 1943) 
 
Predictably, the decision was hailed by progressives; newspapers and their allies condemned it. 
The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, where the AP lost again two years later. 
Arguing that freedom of the press protected all of society, not just media owners, the majority 
opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black, stated that the First Amendment ‘‘rests on the assumption 
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of free society…freedom to 
publish means freedom for all and not for some.’’ ‘‘It would be strange indeed,’’ the court opined, 
‘‘if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment 
should be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom.’’ 
The necessity of state guaranteed public interest protections in the press was clear: ‘‘Freedom of 
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction 
repression of that freedom by private interests’’ (Associated Press 1945). Although the Chicago 
Sun, which initiated the original suit against the AP, hailed the court’s ruling as ‘‘a victory for the 
American people,’’ most of the commercial press reacted negatively to the verdict (The Guild 
Reporter 1945b). 
Newspapers’ vulnerability was also signaled by maneuvers originating within 
government’s legislative branch. Congressional critics began to probe newspapers’ monopolistic 
practices and issue reports in the mid-1940s. One report focused on economic concentration 
during the war, including concerns about newspaper consolidation: ‘‘free critical inquiry and the 
open expression of opposing points of view comprise one of the essential ingredients of a political 
democracy.’’ Thus ‘‘citizens in so many communities can buy only one daily paper and that in so 
many cases these single dailies present the point of view of the same newspaper chain’’ and ‘‘few 
communities now have more than one version of the news.’’ Noting monopolistic trends in the 
press and the prohibitive costs of starting a newspaper, the report concluded that ‘‘if freedom of 
the press is to be had only through ownership of a newspaper, it can, under present conditions, 
be a reality only for the well-to-do’’ (reprinted in The Guild Reporter 1946b, 3). 
Concurrently, the US Senate Small Business Committee announced that it would 
investigate what it referred to as ‘‘obstacles to free competition’’ (The Guild Reporter 1946d, 8). 
Near the end of his chairmanship of the Committee, Democratic Senator James Murray released 
a 71-page report, Survival of a Free Competitive Press: The Small Newspaper, Democracy’s Grass 
Roots, which called for federal oversight of and a series of hearings on newspaper ownership 
patterns’ effects on small publishers. The report drew a dark portrait of a decimated small-town 
newspaper industry. Instead of speaking in terms limited to economic considerations, it was clear 
in drawing linkages between a monopolistic newspaper industry and dire effects on American 
democracy (U.S. Congress 1947). 
Murray’s Committee statement put it starkly: ‘‘High mortality among daily papers, 
continued growth of newspaper monopolies and the squeezing out of small local papers and 
weeklies has posed a major problem for the 80th Congress.’’ Given that the ‘‘future of the small 
press business is linked with the future of . . . political democracy’’ and that the ‘‘traditionally 
valued American system of small competing press units is now in such serious jeopardy,’’ the 
situation ‘‘warrant[ed] the immediate attention of Congress.’’ ‘‘The competitive press is dying,’’ 
Murray wrote, because of ‘‘the rising costs of entering and operating small newspapers 
profitably, newsprint and other shortages, and a technological revolution [facsimile newspapers 
sent over FM frequencies to a home receiver and reproduced on sensitized paper] already 
diverting revenue from the small papers.’’ Murray reported that 200 papers consumed 85 
percent of the nation’s total newsprint, leaving the rest to be divided among 17,000 smaller 
dailies (The Guild Reporter 1947a, 5). More hearings and possible legislation to deal with the 
disappearance of small local papers were planned, but later aborted after the Republicans’ 1946 
congressional sweep. Senate Republicans instead changed the hearings’ focus to newsprint 
shortages, and their allies in the trade press dismissed Murray’s report (Editor & Publisher 1946a, 
26; The Guild Reporter 1946d, 8). Although congressional investigation of the disappearance of 
small newspapers never amounted to a serious intervention, this regulatory activism in 
conjunction with the aforementioned court decisions alerted the commercial press that its 
privileged position in society--a position insulated from government intervention--was at risk. An 
antidote was needed. 
 
Searching for an Antidote 
 
In response to the rising chorus of criticism--from Congress, the Roosevelt administration, 
the courts, and the public--members of the newspaper industry, from publishers down to 
working journalists, attempted to professionalize their craft. They endeavored to become 
‘‘socially responsible’’ but remain self-regulated, hoping to inoculate themselves against further 
criticism and, more importantly, government regulatory intervention. For this perception of 
social responsibility to take hold, a proper forum was needed. The unlikely vehicle for legitimating 
this norm of social responsibility became known as the Hutchins Commission. 
As distilled from several different accounts, the genesis of the Hutchins Commission can 
be traced back to a casual exchange between two unlikely friends who had been schoolmates at 
Yale: Time and Life founder Henry Luce, whom the historian Michael Denning (1996, 84) describes 
as a ‘‘self-conscious propagandist for American business, celebrating investment bankers and 
corporate leaders on the cover of Time,’’ and Robert Hutchins, president of the University of 
Chicago. In 1943, both men were at an Encyclopaedia Britannica Board of Directors meeting and, 
according to the official narrative, Luce asked Hutchins about freedom of the press and what 
responsibilities it entailed. Hutchins said he did not know, but would be interested in organizing 
a committee to study the question if Luce would pay for it (Bates 1995). 
Although a charming tale, a more realistic version of the story is that Luce, like other press 
barons, saw the writing on the wall. The Roosevelt administration and progressive New Dealers 
had been gearing up to investigate the newspaper industry since at least the late 1930s, and by 
the early to mid-1940s these efforts were coming to fruition. Criticism from fellow journalists, 
intellectuals, and other sectors of the public were troubling, but the industry had also recently 
endured an FCC investigation of newspaper ownership of radio and television stations; the DOJ’s 
antitrust crusade--affirmed by the Supreme Court--against the AP; congressional investigations 
into the disappearance of small-town newspapers; and moreover, threats to investigate 
newspapers’ censorship and propaganda practices during the war. It was common knowledge 
that newspapers, reflecting biases shared by many big businesses at the time, had caused 
considerable grief for the Roosevelt administration with their anti-New Deal coverage and 
endorsements of its political opponents. Retributions were almost expected. Newspaper trade 
meetings had become rumor mills predicting how the government aimed to break up newspaper 
chains, as it recently had or was attempting to do in the radio and film industries. More 
governmental strikes against the press seemed quite plausible (Time 1941). 
By 1943, publishers and their ilk had good reason to worry. Given multiple attacks from 
the intelligentsia, the printers unions, the Newspaper Guild, the courts, Congress, the Roosevelt 
administration, the FCC, and the public, newspaper owners were awakening to the considerable 
forces aligning against their laissez-faire privileges. Instead of waiting for governmental 
intervention, Luce attempted to steal a march. Ultimately Luce would fund about $200,000 for a 
commission, allowing Hutchins to enlist a dozen preeminent American intellectuals to define the 
press’s democratic responsibilities. As Blanchard (1977, 3) notes, ‘‘the press had reason to 
welcome the Hutchins inquiry,’’ especially given the detrimental court decisions driving First 
Amendment protections away from publishers and toward the public. However, publishers did 
not immediately receive the saving rationales they desired from the industry-funded Hutchins 
Commission. Despite Luce’s goal to inoculate the industry against governmental regulation, 
members of the Hutchins Commission, like many 1940s liberal intellectuals, had reformist 
instincts, and their deliberations would prove to be more than a reliable whitewash. 
 A detailed account falls beyond this study’s scope, but drawing from an analysis that I 
expand on elsewhere (Pickard 2010), it is clear that the Commission’s opinions were fairly 
conflicted over competing visions of press freedom. After considering a number of alternatives 
and interventions, ranging from municipal-owned newspapers and government- aided start-ups 
to aggressive antitrust measures, the norm-setting codes of professionalization established by 
the landmark Commission would, ironically, help shield the industry from subsequent reform. 
The Commission ultimately elevated an intellectual rationale for self-regulation based on a 
libertarian understanding of the First Amendment, one that had been recently dismissed by the 
Supreme Court. This ethical stance was later codified as ‘‘social responsibility’’ (Siebert, 
Schramm, and Peterson 1956), and discursively foreclosed on future regulatory efforts against 
newspapers. The outcomes of these normative debates in the 1940s helped concretize industry-
friendly notions of American ‘‘freedom of the press.’’ Despite fundamental flaws exposed during 
a moment of crisis, the press was spared significant structural reform, only to erupt in crisis once 
again in the early decades of the twenty-first century. 
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